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Abstract
This paper investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy
affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy contingent
securities in the stock market. We show that the demand for redistribution is always
smaller than in the case where no ”policy-insurance market” is available. Consistent
with the empirical evidence, our analysis implies that in economies with well-developed
financial markets the level of redistribution decreases with the level of participation in
these markets and with income inequality. We show that the existence of a policy in-
surance market may increase future expected inequality even if a majority of individuals
are redistributing resources through private transfers.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between income distribution and citizens’ demand for redistribution has
long been a central issue in political economy. The seminal paper of Meltzer and Richard
[16] presents a simple but powerful argument: the more positive-skewed the distribution
of income, the higher the political support for redistributive taxation. However, this
argument is not supported by the data. As pointed out by Be´nabou [4] among others,
for advanced countries the relationship runs in the opposite direction: societies that are
more equal before redistribution tend to redistribute more rather than less.
In order to reconcile the basic insights of political-economy theories of redistribution
with the empirical evidence, the recent literature has emphasized the potentially im-
portant role of individual uncertainty in explaining citizens’ demand for redistribution.
Be´nabou and Ok [5], for example, show that if agents are uncertain about their prospect
of future income and policies are persistent, relatively poor agents may choose to oppose
a redistributive policy (see also Piketty [21]).
∗This paper is a chapter of my doctoral dissertation. I am grateful to Bob Inman, Andrew Postlewaite,
Frank Schorfheide, and in particular to Antonio Merlo for their comments and encouragement. I also
benefitted from discussions with Mike Alvarez, Marco Cozzi, Federico Echenique, Jan Eeckhout, Jacob
Goeree, Daniela Iorio, Matt Jackson, Dirk Krueger, Elena Pastorino and Nicola Persico. All usual
disclaimers apply.
A largely unexplored issue, however, is whether citizens’ reaction to policy uncer-
tainty plays any role in understanding the relationship between income distribution and
the likelihood of adopting redistributive policies. Political uncertainty is a pervasive phe-
nomenon which is inherent to the political process. It naturally arises because different
candidates running for office, if elected, will implement different policies, and election
results are uncertain; that is what happened, for example, in the last two Presidential
elections in the United States.1 Furthermore, even after a candidate is elected, there
might still be uncertainty about the likelihood that he will be able to implement his
electoral promises (this is the case, for example, with the health care reform that was at
the center of Clinton’s 1992 Presidential campaign but was defeated in Congress during
his presidency).
In this paper, I investigate how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution
policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy-
contingent securities. If individuals are risk averse and financial markets can provide
insurance against policy uncertainty, redistribution will take place via the stock market,
irrespective of whether the policy is implemented or not. Therefore, the existence of a
“policy insurance market” will affect the equilibrium demand for redistribution policies,
and, in turn, the likelihood that such policies will ultimately be implemented.
I propose an equilibrium model where agents who are ex-ante heterogeneous with
respect to their income can trade policy-contingent securities and then vote on a redistri-
bution policy whose probability of adoption increases with the number of its supporters.
In this model, the very poor are excluded from the policy insurance market. The extent
to which participation is constrained determines the “size” of the market. I show that as
long as some individuals do not have access to the policy insurance market, the demand
for redistribution is always smaller than in the case where no insurance is available. In
equilibrium, relatively poor individuals receive private transfers from the rich through the
insurance market, and oppose a public redistribution policy that they would otherwise
have supported.
This model implies a relationship between income inequality and support for redis-
1For an extensive analysis of voters’ information in U.S. Presidential elections see Alvarez [1].
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tribution. This relationship is non-monotonic and depends on the size of the policy
insurance market. In particular, in economies with well-developed financial markets the
level of redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with
income inequality. Moreover, the size of the market also affects the inequality of the ex-
pected income distribution. In particular, I show that the existence of a policy insurance
market may increase future expected inequality even if a majority of individuals are ac-
tually redistributing resources through private transfers. I use these theoretical findings
to interpret the empirical evidence on the relationships between income inequality and
redistribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
literature. Section 3 presents a simplified version of the model showing the main effect
of the policy insurance market on individuals’ behavior. Section 4 contains the general
equilibrium model. Section 5 deals with the effects of the policy insurance market on
the inequality of the expected income distribution after policy uncertainty is resolved.
Section 6 explores the implications of the existence of a policy insurance market on the
relationship between income inequality and popular support for redistribution. Section
7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There are three strands of literature that are related to this paper. The first strand
focuses on the interaction between politics and financial markets. Musto and Yilmaz [17]
consider a model where two candidates with different ideologies compete for election by
announcing redistribution policies and, unlike my model, all voters can share the “wealth
risk” associated with different electoral outcomes by trading election-contingent securities
in a frictionless financial market. They show that, since complete financial markets induce
full insurance, all voters, regardless of their wealth, are indifferent between alternative
redistribution policies. Hence, wealth considerations have no effect on electoral outcomes.
Celentani et al. [7] analyze risk sharing and endogenous fiscal spending in the presence of
complete markets. They show that if markets are sequentially complete, fiscal policy can
be used to manipulate future security prices leading to inefficient equilibrium allocations.
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The second strand of literature presents different theoretical explanations for the
fact that income inequality and popular support for redistribution are not positively
correlated. Be´nabou [4] shows that if redistribution is ex-ante welfare improving the
support for redistribution is U-shaped in inequality. Lee and Roemer [13] show that
public spending is not necessarily increasing in inequality since, as inequality rises, a
given tax rate produces a smaller tax base.
The third strand of literature is on the empirical relationship between politics and the
stock market. Mattozzi [14] shows that existing stocks that are currently traded on the
U.S. stock market can be used to insure against political uncertainty. Focusing on the
2000 U.S. Presidential election, he constructs two “presidential portfolios” composed of
selected stocks anticipated to fare differently under a Bush versus a Gore presidency. To
construct these portfolios he uses data on campaign contributions by publicly traded cor-
porations and identify the major contributors on each side (excluding corporations that
made significant contributions to both candidates’ campaigns). Using daily observations
for the six months before the election took place, he shows that the excess returns of these
portfolios with respect to overall market movements are significantly related to changes
in electoral polls. Based on the evidence, he concludes that the presidential portfolios
can actually be used as an instrument to hedge political uncertainty. Knight [12] tests
whether policy platforms are capitalized into equity prices, using data from the 2000 U.S.
Presidential election. He selects a sample of firms favored under the alternative policy
platforms using reports from financial analysts, and shows that campaign platforms mat-
ter for firms’ profitability. In a similar vein, Herron et al. [11] study the effect of the
1992 U.S. Presidential election outcome on the profitability of different economic sectors,
and Ayers et al. [3] study whether security prices reflect fiscal policy uncertainty, using
data from the same election.2
2At a more aggregate level, see also Pantzalis et al. [18], and Santa-Clara and Valkanov [22].
In light of the third strand of literature, it is worth noticing that, although betting on Presidential
Elections is illegal in the U.S., in 2004 the Irish company Tradesports started offering a winner-take-all
contract on the U.S. Presidential election.
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3 An Example
In this section I present a simple example in order to show two important results of this
paper: First, as long as some individuals do not have access to the policy insurance mar-
ket, the demand for redistribution is always smaller than in the case where no insurance
is available. Second, an increase in income inequality may actually decrease the popular
support for redistribution.
Consider a one-period model with three agents and logarithmic utility function over
wealth. Each agent has an initial endowment of yi, i = {1, 2, 3}, where y1 = h, y2 = m,
and y3 = l. Assume that h > m > l, and m < h+m+l
3
= y¯ (that is, the median is below
the mean). Agents have to choose between two different alternatives: the status quo, and
a reform that taxes wealth proportionally at rate τ and redistributes τ y¯ to every agent.
Sincere voting is weakly dominant with two alternatives, and since voting is costless, each
agent will vote for the alternative that gives him higher utility. If indifferent between
alternatives, agents randomize with equal probability.
Policy uncertainty is modeled by assuming that there is ex-ante uncertainty about
the probability that the reform will be implemented. In particular, suppose that the
probability of implementing the redistribution policy is equal to the share of its supporters
in the population.3 Given that m < y¯, the only agent that is strictly worse off with the
reform is yi = h. Therefore, the expected probability q that the redistributive reform will
be adopted is equal to 2
3
.
Suppose now that before voting over the reform a financial market is open. Agents
can trade any quantity b of a financial security that pays 1 if the reform is implemented
and pays 0 otherwise.4 Let p be the price of the bond.
The maximization problem that agents solve is:
max
by
q ln
((
yi + byi (1− p)
)
(1− τ) + τ y¯)+ (1− q) ln (yi − byip) ,
and market clearing requires:
bl + bm + bh = 0,
3See the next Section for a discussion of this assumption.
4The argument is similar if instead b pays 0 when the reform is implemented and 1 otherwise.
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where byi denotes the quantity of the security traded by the agent with initial endowment
yi = {l,m, h}. By taking first order conditions and using the market clearing condition
I get5:
b∗yi =
(
yi − y¯)ψ (τ , q)
p∗ =
q (1− τ)
1− τq ,
where ψ (τ , q) is positive.6 Note that, since the security is a fair insurance and every
agent can access the financial market, in equilibrium the wealth in the two states has to
be the same. Every agent will be indifferent and the final probability of adopting the
reform will depend on the tie-breaking rule. Moreover, irrespective of whether or not the
reform is implemented, the ex post wealth distribution will be:
yi (1− τq) + y¯τq, yi = {h,m, l} .
Therefore redistribution (through private transfers) will take place anyway. This result
is similar to the one obtained by Musto and Yilmaz [17].
Consider now the case in which access to the financial market is conditional on having
a given positive amount γ of initial endowment. For example assume that the poorest
agent yi = l cannot participate in the financial market (l < γ < m). In this case, the
new equilibrium will be:
b∗yi =
(
yi − m+ h
2
)
ψ¯ (τ , q,m, h, y¯)
p∗ =
q (1− τ)
1− τ + 2τ y¯(1−q)
m+h
>
q (1− τ)
1− τq ,
where ψ¯ (τ , q,m, h, y¯) is positive, and, in equilibrium, every agent that can access the
market, namely yi = {m,h}, will strictly prefer the status quo to the reform for any
q?(0,1).7 Therefore, in equilibrium, the expected probability q˜ that the redistributive
5I assume l > (m+h)(1−q)τ3(1−qτ)−(1−q)τ in order to rule out corner solutions.
6In this particular example,
ψ (τ , q) =
τ (1− τq)
1− τ .
7In this particular example,
ψ¯ (τ , q,m, h, y¯) =
2
m+ h
(
1− τ + 2τy¯m+h (1− q)
)
τ y¯(
1− τ + 2τy¯m+h
)
(1− τ)
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reform will be adopted is equal to 1
3
, that is strictly smaller than in the case where no
insurance is available.
To see the intuition behind this result note that if everybody has access to the financial
market, the h agent can buy out m and l, by making them at most indifferent between the
two policies. If the poor agent cannot access the market, the resulting decline in supply
will increase the equilibrium price. At the new price agent m is more than compensated
by private transfers, and therefore she strictly prefers the status quo scenario. In other
words, when access to market is unrestricted, all the risk is idiosyncratic and therefore
insurable. Whereas if agent l cannot insure herself part of the risk becomes systematic.
In the redistribution state, the l agent is extracting money from the two other agents,
and they will therefore strictly prefer the status quo.
Suppose now, that holding the mean y¯ constant, h decreases to h′ < h and l increases
to l′ > γ > l. As a result, the popular support for redistribution and therefore the
probability of adopting the redistribution will increase even if the initial distribution of
endowments is more equal.8
In the following three sections I show that the conclusions obtained above hold in
a more general environment and explore the relationship between inequality and the
adoption of redistributive policies.
4 The Model
There is a continuum of agents of measure one. Each agent is endowed with pre-tax
income y ≥ 0 that is an independent draw from a known distribution F with density f
and support Y . Let
y¯ =
∫
Y
ydF (y)
be the mean income.
Agents are called to vote on the adoption of a reform. Two alternatives are available:
8Clearly, in this simple example, the result depends on the tie-breaking rule.
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the status quo versus a policy (τ , T ), where τ is a proportional tax on wealth and T is a
per-capita lump sum transfer. I assume that the budget is balanced, that is T = τ y¯.
Following most of the literature on redistributive taxation, I use a simple linear tax as
a convenient way to describe my results. The implications of our analysis are, however,
more general and hold for a larger class of policies entailing a conflict of interest between
those who gain from it and those who are hurt by it.
As in the previous section, policy uncertainty is modeled by assuming that there is
ex-ante uncertainty about the probability that the reform will be implemented. Namely,
I assume that the probability of implementing the redistribution policy increases mono-
tonically with the number of its supporters. In other words, for given proportion q of
individuals in favor of the redistributive policy, the probability that this policy will be
actually implemented is ϕ (q) ∈ [0, 1], where ϕ (1
2
)
= 1
2
, and ∂ϕ(q)
∂q
> 0.9 As long as ϕ (q) is
continuous and strictly increasing, its particular shape is not going to affect qualitatively
the results. Therefore, for simplicity, let ϕ (q) be the identity function.10 The ex-ante
probability of adopting the redistribution policy is:
q = F (y¯) .
Before elections are held, a financial market opens. Agents can trade any quantity b of
a security that pays 1 when the reform is enacted and 0 otherwise. Let p be the security
price and γ > 0 be an exogenous threshold on pre-tax income above which agents have
access to the market.11 This assumption has the merit of making transparent the force
that is driving the result, and will be relaxed later by considering the existence of an ex-
post individual budget constraint on the amount of securities that can be traded. Finally,
I assume that the utility function U (x) belongs to the class of hyperbolic absolute risk
9I borrow this modelling assumption from Grossman and Helpman [8].
10An alternative way to model policy uncertainty is to borrow from the probabilistic voting literature,
and assume the existence of an individual-specific ideological bias (in favor or against redistribution)
that is drawn from a known distribution.
11Guiso et al. [9][10] show that the proportion of US households investing in risky assets, with gross
financial wealth falling in the lowest quartile, is 1.4%. This proportion is less than 1% for the UK, the
Netherlands, and Italy, and less than 3% for Germany. If we consider direct and indirect stockholding,
all figures are below 5%, with the exception of Germany at 6.6%.
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aversion (HARA), and it is strictly concave. In particular, I assume that wealth level x,
gives the agent a utility of:
U (x) =
1− θ
θ
(
αx
1− θ + β
)θ
αx
1− θ + β > 0,
and strict concavity requires:
α > 0.
Constant absolute risk aversion, constant relative risk aversion, and logarithmic utility
specifications are special cases of the HARA utility.12
The maximization problem that agents solve is13:
max
b
qU ((y + b (1− p)) (1− τ) + τ y¯) + (1− q)U (y − bp) .
Market clearing requires: ∫
Y |y>γ
bdF (y) = 0.
U (x) belonging to the class of HARA utility function is a sufficient condition for unique-
ness of equilibrium. Therefore, in the unique equilibrium:
b∗ (y) = (y − y˜) τ
1− τ
αy¯ + β (1− θ)
αy˜ + β (1− θ)
(1− q)h1−θ + q (1− τ)
(1− q)h1−θ + qh (1)
p∗ =
q (1− τ)
(1− q)h1−θ + q (1− τ) , (2)
where
h =
α (y˜ (1− τ) + τ y¯) + β (1− θ)
αy˜ + β (1− θ) ,
12If β = 1 and θ → −∞, we have the CARA utility, if β → 0, α = 1 − θ, the CRRA utility obtains.
If β → 0, θ → 0 we have the logarithmic utility specification.
13Notice I am not imposing any constraint on the maximization problem. This implies in principle
that agents can sell an amount of securities greater than their pre-tax endowment and end up paying a
negative tax. As long as γ is not too small this will never happen in equilibrium (see the Appendix for
the general case).
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and
y˜ =
∫
Y |y>γ ydF (y)∫
Y |y>γ dF (y)
≥ y¯,
y˜ > γ.
Finally, note that
y˜ > γ.
I can use the equilibrium characterization to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For any continuous distribution F (y), all active agents on the
market (y ≥ γ) strictly prefer the status quo.
Proof. All agents participating in the market strictly prefer the status quo if and
only if:
U (y − b∗ (y) p) > U ((y + b∗ (y) (1− p)) (1− τ) + τ y¯) .
By using (1) , I can rewrite the above inequality as
p >
q (1− τ)
1− qτ .
By using (2) , in the unique equilibrium it will be
p∗ >
q (1− τ)
1− qτ ,
if and only if
h < 1.
But since
y˜ ≥ y¯,
h is always smaller than 1.
In order to capture the intuition behind this result, consider Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1
depicts the demand schedule b∗ (y) as a function of y, in the case of U (x) = x
1−α−1
1−α , α = 2,
τ = 1
2
, y ∼ U [0, 1] and γ = {0, 1
4
}
. It shows how agents react to policy uncertainty:
rich (poor) agents buy (sell) a positive amount of securities. Since y˜ is the mean of the
income distribution truncated at γ and, in equilibrium, it is equal to the income level of
10
the indifferent agent on the market, it follows that b∗ (y˜) = 0. Note that y˜ is increasing
in γ, and an increase in γ induces a reduction, in equilibrium, of the total amount of
securities traded and therefore a reduction of the size of the market. If individuals with
incomes in the left tail of the distribution cannot access the market, the resulting excess
in demand will increase the security price. This is the reason why the two schedules
depicted in Figure 1 do not overlap. The result stated in Proposition 1 follows from the
fact that, at the new equilibrium price, all agents trading in the market whose income is
below the mean income, are more than compensated by private transfers, and therefore
they strictly prefer the status quo scenario.
Figure 2 depicts the difference DU in utility between the status quo and the redistri-
bution state as a function of y, and γ, using the same parametrization of Figure 1. When
γ = 1 (no trading at all), DU is monotonically increasing, and DU (y¯) = 0. When γ = 0
(unrestricted trading), DU is equal to zero for all y. The most interesting case is when
γ ∈ (0, 1). For low values of y, DU is negative and increasing. For values of y greater
than γ (set equal to 1
4
in the picture), DU is always positive. The chosen parametriza-
tion affects the shape of DU but not its quasi-monotonicity property.14 Given that every
agent that can trade in the market will strictly prefer the status quo policy, the resulting
expected probability q˜ of implementing the redistributive policy will be:
q˜ = min {F (γ) , F (y¯)} ≤ q.
Therefore, Proposition 2 follows:
Proposition 2. For any continuous distribution F (y), the ex-post probability q˜ of
adopting redistribution is (weakly) smaller than the ex-ante probability q, and an increase
in the size of market (a decrease in γ) decreases the support for the reform.
Figure 2 offers an alternative way to capture the economic intuition behind this result.
Consider the problem faced by the marginal agent that can trade in the market in the
14For example in the case of
U (x) = lnx,
DU is flat for y > γ.
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most interesting case of γ < y¯, that is the marginal agent is relatively poor and hence,
in equilibrium, he will sell a positive amount of securities. If the redistributive policy is
not implemented, he will receive a private transfer from rich agents that is compensating
him for not having his ex-ante most preferred alternative. If the redistributive policy
will be the selected alternative, he has to make a private transfer to rich individuals.
However, this transfer has to compensate the rich agents also for the additional amount
of redistribution that is due to the fact that the very poor agents cannot trade in the
market. Therefore, in equilibrium, he will strictly prefer to vote for his ex-ante least
preferred alternative.
As I already pointed out, assuming an exogenous γ has the merit of making transpar-
ent the force that is driving the result. However, the result of Proposition 2 continues to
hold even if I drop the assumption of an exogenous threshold on pre-tax income above
which agents have access to the market. In particular, in the Appendix, I explicitly con-
sider the existence of an ex-post individual budget constraint on the amount of securities
that can be traded, and set γ =y, where y is the lower bound of Y . (i.e. unrestricted
access to the financial market).
Finally, note that under the assumption of an exogenous γ, the equilibrium value
of q˜ does not depend on q. This is not generally true when we relax this assumption.
Nonetheless, it can be shown that, also in the more general case, there exists a unique
equilibrium in which the proportion of agents in favor of redistribution is always strictly
smaller than in the case where agents do not react to electoral uncertainty (see Appendix).
The main results of this section are that as long as poor individuals are constrained in
policy insurance market, the demand for redistribution is always smaller than in the case
where no insurance is available, and the size of the market is positively correlated with
the probability that a redistributive reform is adopted. In the next section I show that
the size of the market also affects the inequality of the expected income distribution, and
the existence of a policy insurance market may increase future expected inequality even if
a majority of individuals are actually redistributing resources through private transfers.
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5 Expected Income Distribution
In this model, private redistribution takes place before the election even in the case where
the reform is ultimately not implemented. The objective of this section is to analyze the
effect of the policy insurance market on the inequality of the expected income distribution
after policy uncertainty is resolved.
I can compare the degree of inequality of different income distributions using the
concept of second order stochastic dominance. Fx is more unequal than Fy, if Fx is a
mean preserving spread of Fy. More formally, let X be the common support of Fy and
Fx, then Fx is more unequal than Fy if:∫
X
xdFx =
∫
X
xdFy,
and ∫ x
x
(Fx − Fy) ds ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X, (3)
where x is the lower bound of X. The equality of means implies that:
∫
X
Fx =
∫
X
Fy.
Hence if Fx and Fy cross only once, (1) is satisfied.
Let z be the expected income after elections without market:
z = qτ y¯ + (1− qτ) y.
By using the convolution formula:
Fz =
 F
(
z−qτ y¯
1−qτ
)
for z ≥ qτ y¯ + (1− qτ) y
0 otherwise,
where y is the lower bound of Y . Since F and Fz have the same mean, F
(
y
)
> Fz
(
y
)
= 0,
and they cross only once, F is a mean preserving spread of Fz. I will use Fz as a
benchmark to evaluate the effect of the market in terms of expected income distribution.
I have to consider two cases:
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Case 1 γ ≥ y¯
In this case the electoral market redistributes income through private transfers but
does not affect the probability of adopting the reform. Let zm be the expected income
after elections with market, and Fzm be the expected income distribution.
Proposition 3. If γ ≥ y¯ the introduction of the electoral market decreases expected
income inequality for any continuous initial distribution F .
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Figure 3 provides the intuition. Fzm and Fz
have the same support and are identical for y < γ. Since they have the same mean, the
areas denoted by A, and B in Figure 3 are equivalent, therefore Fz is a mean preserving
spread of Fzm .
Case 2 γ ∈ (y, y¯)
In this case the effect of the electoral market is twofold: it redistributes income
through private transfers before the reform takes place, and it affects the probability of
adopting the reform. The next proposition provides a sufficient condition under which
the latter effect is dominant and the conclusion of Proposition 3 is reversed.
Proposition 4. There exists a γ∗ ∈ (y, y¯), such that if γ ≤ γ∗ the introduction
of the electoral market increases expected income inequality for any continuous initial
distribution F .
The proof is in the Appendix. Figure 4 provides a graphical intuition in the case of
γ ≤ γ∗. If γ ≤ γ∗ it is possible to show that Fzm and Fz cross only once. Since they have
the same mean, it follows that Fzm is a mean preserving spread of Fz.
When the financial market is widely accessible, a large redistribution is actually taking
place before the election, and this maps in a smaller support for the redistribution state.
Therefore we should expect the policy insurance market to have a positive effect of on
expected inequality. This section demonstrates, however, that this might not be the case.
Even if a large proportion of agents is moving resources from one state to the other, as
long as the lower tail of the distribution is still completely exposed to the electoral risk,
the gap between losers and winners widens and, moreover, there is a shift of probability
14
mass on the status quo. When the policy insurance market is large, agents’ reaction to
electoral uncertainty leads, in expectation, to a distribution even less equal.
6 Income Inequality and Redistribution
In this section, I study the relationship between income inequality and redistribution in
an economy where the income distribution is positively-skewed. In particular, to analyze
the effect of the initial income distribution on the expected probability q˜ of implementing
the redistributive policy, assume that income is drawn from a Pareto distribution with
parameters c > 0 and ∆ < 1.15 Under these assumptions we have that:
F (y) = 1−
(
c
y
) 1
∆
,
y¯ =
c
1−∆
y¯
ymed
=
1
(1−∆) 2∆ ,
Gini =
∆
2−∆ .
In the case without a policy insurance market, the probability of adopting the reform
is given by:
q = F (y¯) = 1− (1−∆) 1∆ .
An increase in ∆, which increases the Gini index as well as the ratio between mean
and median income, unambiguously increases q. This is what a median voter model
would have predicted. A reform with asymmetric benefit will be more popular the more
polarized a society is, provided that a majority of voters was already in favor of it.
The comparative statics of the model are quite different if I consider the presence of
the market. Indeed, for γ > c, the end of period probability of implementing the reform
15The same analysis holds if I assume a log normal distribution. The log normal distribution is a
reasonable approximation of the US empirical distribution of income. The Pareto distribution is a
reasonable approximation of the empirical distribution of high incomes. See Lee and Roemer [13] and
Be´nabou [4].
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is now given by the following expression:
q˜ =
 1−
(
c
γ
) 1
∆
γ < c
1−∆
1− (1−∆) 1∆ γ > c
1−∆ ,
and, therefore, Proposition 5 follows:
Proposition 5. An increase in inequality will decrease (increase) the expected prob-
ability of adopting the reform if and only if γ < (>) y¯. In particular:
dq˜
d∆
=
 (
c
γ )
1
∆
∆2
ln c
γ
< 0 γ < y¯ = c
1−∆
(1−∆) 1−∆∆ (1−∆) ln(1−∆)+∆
∆2
> 0 γ > y¯.
Increasing inequality has two distinct effects on the political support for redistribution:
(i) given the distributional assumptions, it shifts probability mass towards below-average
income, (ii) for given γ, it affects the fraction of agents who trade in the market. The
first effect increases the value of q˜, the second effect decreases the value of q˜. In the case
in which relatively poor individuals participate in the market, i.e. γ < y¯, the second
effect dominates, and an increase in inequality decreases the likelihood of adopting the
reform. When γ gets larger, the existence of insurance only affects rich individuals
that were already against redistribution. Hence, the first effect is the dominant one,
and an increase in inequality is positively correlated with the likelihood of adopting the
redistributive reform. Furthermore, notice that, since in the case of a Pareto distribution
y¯ = c
1−∆ is increasing in ∆, for fixed γ we can always find a ∆˜ such that γ =
c
1−∆˜ .
Therefore, for intermediate values of γ, the relationship between income inequality and
support for redistribution may be non-monotonic.
Figure 5 depicts the relationship between income inequality as measured by ∆, and
the equilibrium probability q˜ of adopting the reform for different values of γ.
The relationship between income inequality and support for redistribution depends
crucially on the size of the policy insurance market. If financial markets can provide
insurance against policy uncertainty, Proposition 5 implies that in economies with well-
developed financial markets the level of redistribution decreases with the level of partici-
pation in these markets and with income inequality. The latter result provides a possible
16
explanation for the empirical observation that, among advanced economies, countries
that are more equal before redistribution tend to redistribute more rather than less.
This is illustrated in Figure 6, that depicts a cross-country scatter plot of the relation-
ship between Gini index and the ratio to GDP of transfers to households for OECD
economies.16
Finally note that Proposition 5 implies that, for a given level of inequality in the
income distribution, different countries can support very different level of redistribution
depending on the development of their financial institutions. A failure of not taking into
account this aspect may lead to a misspecified empirical model of the relationship be-
tween inequality and redistribution. This is due to the fact that we are mixing regimes.
In particular, this may provide an explanation of why Perotti [19] among others finds no
significant empirical relationship between inequality and the share of transfers or gov-
ernment expenditures in GDP, when he considers a sample of developed and developing
countries.
6.1 Discussion
In the previous section I have shown that a non-monotonic relationship between inequality
and popular support for redistribution is obtained in the case of an increase in the Gini
index, or in the ratio between mean and median income. This particular increase in
inequality is clearly not a mean preserving spread. In general, in any standard median
voter type of model, a mean preserving spread in the distribution of income can hardly
induce a negative relationship between inequality and redistribution. Furthermore, even
if the redistribution is ex-ante welfare improving, a symmetric, mean preserving spread
in any symmetric distribution of income cannot generate a non-monotonic relationship.17
16Data are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook and Deninger and Squire dataset (1996), available
at URL: http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm
In light of the existing literature on the relationship between different electoral systems and the size
of the redistributive sector (see, e.g. Austen-Smith [2]), it is worth noting that a similar picture also
obtains if I restrict attention to parliamentary democracies with a proportional electoral system.
17A symmetric, mean preserving spread leads to a decline in popular support for an ex-ante welfare
improving redistribution, and to an increase in popular support for a redistribution that entails some
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This is also true in the present model under the assumption of an exogenous threshold on
pre-tax income above which agents have access to the market. However, in this subsection
I show that in the more general and realistic case where agents have an ex-post individual
budget constraint on the amount of securities that can be traded, and I set γ =y (i.e.
unrestricted access to the financial market), I can easily construct examples where even
a symmetric mean preserving spread in the distribution of income can generate a non-
monotonic relationship between inequality and support for redistribution.
Assume that income y is distributed in [0, 1] with density function f (y), where
f (y) =

1
2
if y ∈ [0, 1
2
− ε]
1
2
+ 1
4ε
if y ∈ (1
2
− ε, 1
2
+ ε
)
1
2
if y ∈ [1
2
+ ε, 1
]
,
and ε ∈ (0, 1
2
)
. Then
y¯ =
∫ 1
0
ydF (y) =
1
2
,
V ar (y) =
∫ 1
0
(y − y¯)2 dF (y) = 1 + 4ε
2
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.
Therefore, an increase in ε represents a mean preserving spread in the distribution. For
simplicity let τ = 1
2
. Finally, assume a logarithmic utility function. The problem that
agents solve is:
max
b
q ln
(
(y + b (1− p)) 1
2
+
1
4
)
+ (1− q) ln (y − bp)
s.t. y + b (1− p) ≥ 0,
and market clearing requires: ∫ 1
0
bdF (y) = 0.
In equilibrium
deadweight loss. See Be´nabou [4], page 100, footnote 7.
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b∗ =

2(q−p)y−p(1−q)
2p(1−p) y >
p(1−q)
2q
− y
1−p y <
p(1−q)
2q
.
In order to solve for the equilibrium price, I have to consider two cases: i) p(1−q)
2q
∈(
1
2
− ε, 1−q
2
)
, and ii)p(1−q)
2q
≤ 1
2
− ε.
In case i), the market clearing condition delivers
p (q) =
q
(
1− q + (7− 3q) 2ε−√2ε
√
84ε− 6q − 52qε+ 7− (q + (1− q) 2ε)2
)
(1 + 2ε) (1− q)2 ,
and if 1−p(q)
4
≤ 1
2
− ε, it follows that q˜ is the unique solution to
q˜ − 1− p (q˜)
8
= 0.
It is possible to show numerically that there exist ε′, and ε′′such that for ε ∈ (ε′, ε′′), the
support for redistribution is decreasing in the level of inequality, that is ∂q˜
∂ε
< 0. The
opposite relation obtains if ε ∈ (ε′′, 1
2
)
. In case ii), it is a matter of simple algebra to
show that q˜ is independent of ε.
The intuition for this result is that, when ε ∈ (ε′, ε′′), an increase in inequality in-
creases the mass of constrained agents in the market, and the equilibrium price increases
to compensate the resulting excess of demand. The agent that was indifferent between
the redistributive policy and the status quo (that in equilibrium is always a constrained
net seller of electoral securities as it is shown in the Appendix), is now strictly better off
if the redistributive policy is not implemented. By further increasing inequality above ε′′,
the effect on prices is compensated by the increase in the mass of low income individuals
and the relation between inequality and support for redistribution becomes positive. Fi-
nally, if ε is very small, that is a large fraction of the population is concentrated around
the mean, an increase in inequality has no effect on the mass of constrained sellers and,
in this particular example, q˜ is independent of ε.
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7 Conclusion
This paper presents a model that demonstrates the role citizens’ reactions to policy un-
certainty plays in the demand for redistributive policies. I show how ex-ante uncertainty
about a government policy with redistributive consequences will influence the proportion
of agents in favor of it, if a subset of the agents can trade policy-contingent securities. In
an economy with a policy insurance market, there is less demand for redistribution than
in one without such a market, and demand for redistribution may decrease as income
inequality increases. I provide conditions under which the existence of a policy insurance
market increases future expected income inequality even if a large proportion of agents
is redistributing resources through private transfers.
Based on the prediction of the theoretical model, my analysis implies that the level
of participation in the stock market should be negatively related to support for policies
with redistributive content. This result is consistent with several empirical observations.
First, European countries are characterized by smaller participation in the stock market
and larger redistributive transfers with respect to the U.S..18 Furthermore, among all
OECD economies, countries with a higher ratio to GDP of total stock market value
traded, are also characterized by a smaller level of transfers to households as a share of
the GDP, as shown in Figure 7.19
By focusing on the recent U.S. experience, two important facts can be singled out.
First, stock ownership in the U.S. has changed dramatically in the last decade. The pro-
portion of U.S. households owning stocks directly or indirectly (through mutual funds
or retirement accounts) has risen from 31.6 percent in 1989 to 51.9 percent in 2001, and
the median income of stock owners has decreased by more than 9 percent in the period
1989-1998.20 Second, the U.S. level of transfers to households as a share of the GDP
has almost steadily decreased in the nineties’. A similar picture emerges by considering
broader aggregates like the share of total government expenditures over GDP. Moreover,
taking for granted the conventional wisdom that democratic platforms tend to carry more
18See Guiso et al. [10].
19Data are taken from OECD Economic Outlook, and Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine data set
(2001).
20Data are taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances. See also Bertaut and Starr-McCluer [6].
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redistributive spending, the share of democratic votes in House elections has decreased
from 52 percent in 1990 to 47 percent in 2000. Given that the nineties’ were also charac-
terized by an increasing inequality in income distribution, the combination of increasing
stock market participation and decreasing support for redistribution is consistent with
the mechanism described in the theoretical model.21
Clearly, any relationship between stock market participation and preference for re-
distribution that can be inferred from aggregate data may turn out to be spurious and
due to a variety of other phenomena. However, the National Election Study (NES) data
seems a promising starting point for further empirical analysis using micro level data.
The latest waves of the NES contain both individual level information about stock mar-
ket participation, and variables that summarize individual preferences on whether the
government should increase or decrease the level of service/spending.22 It is interesting to
note that in every income quintile the proportion of stock owners who prefer less than or
equal government services and spending with respect to the status quo, is systematically
higher than the proportion of those without stocks. In addition, even after controlling for
sex, race, age, education, and income, a significative negative correlation between stock
ownership and support for policies with redistributive content is observed.23 This is only
preliminary evidence, but it suggests that an economy’s financial structure appears to be
correlated with its policy choices in a way that is consistent with our theoretical model.
21Data are taken from Economic Outlook. The increasing income inequality that characterized the
US economy in the 90s has been documented by Krugman (New York Times, October 20, 2002).
22Alternatively, one could look at preferences revealed by the vote cast in the election. There are two
problems in using this alternative approach. First, one should take into account the selection bias due
to the choice of voting versus abstention in the election. Second, it is not clear which type of election
one should focus on, or how incumbency effects should be treated.
23See also Mattozzi [14].
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Appendix
In the paper all results were derived in the case of exogenously restricted access to the
market and without taking into account the possibility that agent’s budget constraint
was binding. Here I show that the results derived in the previous sections are robust to
the introduction of a budget constraint, and I set γ =y (i.e. unrestricted access to the
financial market). The maximization problem is:
max
b
1− θ
θ
(
q
(
α ((y + b (1− p)) (1− τ) + τ y¯)
1− θ + β
)θ
+ (1− q)
(
α (y − bp)
1− θ + β
)θ)
s.t. y + b (1− p) ≥ 0,
y − bp ≥ 0,
and
∫
Y
bdF (y) = 0,
where the two inequalities represent the budget constraint (for sellers and buyers respec-
tively), and the last equation is the market clearing condition. I will solve the problem
by first assuming that the second constraint (y − bp ≥ 0) does not bind, and then verify
that this is always true in equilibrium. FOCs deliver
b∗ (y) =

(x−(1−τ))αy−αy¯τ−xβ(1−θ)(1−x)
pxα+α(1−p)(1−τ) y ≥ s
− y
1−p y < s
,
where
x =
(
q (1− p) (1− τ)
(1− q) p
) 1
1−θ
,
s =
αy¯τ + xβ (1− θ) (1− x)
xα
(1− p) .
In equilibrium, the market clearing condition is
Q (p) =
∫ s(
− y
1− p
)
dF (y) +
+
∫
s
(x− (1− τ))αy − αy¯τ − xβ (1− θ) (1− x)
pxα + α (1− p) (1− τ) dF (y) = 0.
Note that a necessary condition for an equilibrium to exist is that x > (1− τ) (otherwise
Q (p) < 0). This implies that
p < p¯ =
q
q + (1− q) (1− τ)−θ < q,
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and
Q (p¯) < 0.
Moreover, if p goes to 0,
lim
p→0
Q (p) > 0.
Since Q (p) is continuous in p, an equilibrium always exists. By evaluating d(Q(p))
dp
in
Q (p) = 0:
dQ (p)
dp
|Q(p)=0 =
−x ∫ s y
(1−p)2dF (y) +
dx
dp
∫
s
φ (y, p) dF (y)
px+ (1− p) (1− τ) ,
where
φ (y, p) =
(1− τ)αy + β (1− θ) (px2 + (1− p) (1− τ) (2x− 1)) + αy¯τp
pxα + α (1− p) (1− τ)
is increasing in y, and
dx
dp
= − (1− τ) q
(1− θ) (1− q) p2x
θ < 0.
Since ∫
s
φ (y, p) dF (y) > φ (s, p) (1− F (s)) > 0,
it follows that
dQ (p)
dp
|Q(p)=0 < 0,
and, therefore, the equilibrium price is unique. Note that, for y ≥ s, y − b∗ (y) p is
increasing in y, and
s− b∗ (s) p = s 1
1− p > 0,
and the second inequality constraint is never binding in equilibrium.
Since individuals with incomes in the left tail of the distribution are constrained in
the market, the resulting excess in demand will lead to an equilibrium price higher than
the unconstrained solution. That is:
p >
q (1− τ)
(1− qτ) ,
that in turn implies that
x < 1.
If
y ≥ s,
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it follows that
DU |(y≥s) ≡ U (status quo)− U (redistribution) ≥ 0
if and only if
τ (y − y¯)− (1− τ + pτ) b∗ (y) ≥ 0. (4)
Note that x < 1 implies that
τ − (1− τ + pτ) db
∗ (y)
dy
> 0,
and the RHS of (2) is increasing in y. Since
τ (y − y¯)− (1− τ + pτ) b∗ (y) >
> τ (s− y¯)− (1− τ + pτ) b∗ (s) = αy¯τ (1− x) + xβ (1− θ) (1− x)
xα
> 0,
all agents with income y ≥ s will strictly prefer the status quo policy.
If
y < s,
it follows that
DU |(y<s) ≥ 0
if and only if
1
1− py − τ y¯ ≥ 0.
Since
s > (1− p) τ y¯,
this implies that
DU > 0 if and only if y > (1− p) τ y¯.
Therefore, the ex-post probability q˜ = F ((1− p) τ y¯) of adopting redistribution is always
smaller than the ex-ante probability q = F (y¯).
Note that the above exercise implicitly assume that agents take q as given. If agents
can perfectly anticipate the effect of the financial market, they will consider the expected
q˜ in the maximization problem. Nonetheless, it can be shown that a unique equilibrium
exists in which the proportion of agents in favor of redistribution is always strictly smaller
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than in the case where agents do not react to electoral uncertainty. Indeed, by applying
the Implicit Function Theorem to the equation Q (p) = 0, I can show that
dp
dq
|Q(p)=0 = −
dQ
dq
|Q(p)=0
dQ
dp
|Q(p)=0
=
dx
dq
∫
s
φ(y,p)
px+(1−p)(1−τ)dF (y)
−dQ
dp
|Q(p)=0
> 0,
since
dx
dq
=
(1− p) (1− τ)
(1− θ) (1− q)2 px
θ > 0.
This implies that the bounded function F ((1− p (q)) τ y¯) ∈ [0, F (τ y¯)] is monotonically
decreasing in q. Therefore the mapping
q = F ((1− p (q)) τ y¯)
has a unique fixed point. Since (1− p) τ y¯ < y¯, the result follows·
Proof of Proposition 3
Let zm be the expected income after elections with market and Fzm be the expected
income distribution.
zm =
 (y (y˜ (1− τ) + τ y¯ (1− q)) + y˜qτ y¯)
qτ y¯+y˜(1−τq)
(τ y¯+y˜(1−τ))y˜ for y ≥ γ
qτ y¯ + (1− qτ) y otherwise,
Fzm =

F
(
zm
(τy¯+y˜(1−τ))y˜
qτy¯+y˜(1−τq) −y˜qτ y¯
y˜(1−τ)+τ y¯(1−q)
)
zm ≥ z¯
F (γ) zm ∈ [qτ y¯ + (1− qτ) γ, z¯)
F
(
zm−qτ y¯
1−qτ
)
zm ∈
[
qτ y¯ + (1− qτ) y, qτa+ (1− qτ) γ)
0 zm < qτy¯ + (1− qτ) y,
where z¯ = (γ(y˜(1−τ)+τ y¯(1−q))+y˜qτ y¯)(τ y¯q+y˜(1−τq))
(τ y¯+y˜(1−τ))y˜ . Notice that for y < γ, Fz and Fzm are
identical. For y ≥ γ they cross ones in y = y˜ and, Fz (z¯) > Fzm (z¯) = F (γ). Since the
existence of the market does not affect the mean of the income distribution:∫
γ
Fz =
∫
γ
Fzm ,
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but this implies that: ∫ y
y
(Fz − Fzm) ds ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y ·
Proof of Proposition 4
Let z′m be the expected income after elections with market, and Fz′m be the expected
income distribution when γ ∈ (y, y¯). In this case the end of period probability of imple-
menting the reform q˜ is a function of the size the market, i.e. q˜ = F (γ) < F (y¯) = q.
Hence:
z′m =
 (y (y˜ (1− τ) + τ y¯ (1− q˜)) + y˜τ y¯q˜)
τ y¯q˜+y˜(1−τ q˜)
(τ y¯+y˜(1−τ))y˜ for y ≥ γ
q˜τ y¯ + (1− q˜τ) y otherwise,
Fz′m =

F
(
z′m
(τy¯+y˜(1−τ))y˜
q˜τ y¯+y˜(1−τq˜) −y˜q˜τ y¯
y˜(1−τ)+τ y¯(1−q˜)
)
z′m ≥ z¯′
F (γ) z′m ∈ [q˜τ y¯ + (1− q˜τ) γ, z¯′)
F
(
z′m−q˜τ y¯
1−q˜τ
)
z′m ∈
[
q˜τ y¯ + (1− q˜τ) y, q˜τ y¯ + (1− q˜τ) γ)
0 z′m < q˜τ y¯ + (1− q˜τ) y,
where z¯′ = (γ(y˜(1−τ)+τ y¯(1−q˜))+y˜q˜τ y¯)(τ y¯q˜+y˜(1−τ q˜))
(τ y¯+y˜(1−τ))y˜ . In this case Fz′m (z) > Fz (z) for z ≤
q˜τ y¯ + (1− q˜τ) γ, since q˜ < q. Moreover, Fz (z¯′) > Fz′m (z¯′) if and only if
G (γ) =
(γ (y˜ (1− τ) + τ y¯ (1− q˜)) + y˜q˜τ y¯) (τ y¯q˜ + y˜ (1− τ q˜))
(τ y¯ + y˜ (1− τ)) y˜ − qτ y¯ − γ (1− qτ) > 0.
But notice that
lim
γ→y+
G (γ) = −qτ (y¯ − y) < 0.
To get the desired result we have to check whether the two distribution functions cross
only once for z ≥ z¯′. Since
lim
γ→y+
z¯′ = y,
we have that for γ →y+,
Fz′m (z) > Fz (z)
if and only if
z < y¯.
Therefore, by continuity there exists a γ∗ > 0 such that for γ ∈ (y,γ∗) the introduction
of the electoral market increases expected income inequality for any continuous initial
distribution F .·
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Figure 5: Redistribution and Inequality
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Figure 6: Inequality and Redistribution (OECD)
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Figure 7: Stock Market and Redistribution (O ECD)
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